Research

This thesis presents an investigation into the problems of givenness with respect to Martin Heidegger and the critique of his philosophy by the speculative materialists, especially Quentin Meillassoux. If the latter is correct in that Heidegger is a strong correlationist, then Heidegger’s philosophy would emerge not only to be contrary to scientific inquiry, but also self-contradictory or, at least, absurd. The overarching claim of this thesis is that: (a) Heidegger is not a strong correlationist, since his philosophy permits ontic realism, and to argue otherwise is to confuse the ontic with the ontological; (b) Whilst Heidegger is indeed a weak correlationist, this should be broadly acceptable, since it is not of the Kantian variant, insofar as the ontological difference mirrors not the phenomena-noumena distinction of Kant’s two-world metaphysics; (c) Heidegger’s philosophy does not eliminate the ‘outside’—there ‘is’ an ‘outside’, but ‘it’ cannot be understood as a substantial realm beyond givenness.

We begin with an elaboration of our point of departure (the literature, methodology, basic premises, etc.) in the Introduction. Then, Part 1 rigorously reconstructs Meillassoux’s (and Ray Brassier’s) anti-correlationist argument, and illustrates how Heidegger’s philosophy, both early and later, could fall under correlationism. Subsequently, Part 2 presents a multilayered argument against the correlationist interpretation of Heidegger, that is, it argues for theses (a) and (b). This involves an interpretation of Sein as givenness, a construction of a givenness-based theory of ordinary and physical things, and a distinguishing of truth- and understanding-conditions. Following this, in Part 3, after engaging with Heidegger’s notions of Seyn, destiny, and inception, we further develop the framework constructed thus far by thematising its onto-historical aspects, and, in doing so, we argue for thesis (c).